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COMMENT
SETTLEMENT OFFERS CONDITIONED UPON WAIVER
OF ATTORNEYS' FEES: POLICY, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The primary congressional goal underlying statutes authorizing
awards of attorneys' fees is to encourage the private enforcement of fed-
eral laws.' Seeking to encourage the private enforcement of Reconstruc-
tion Era and other civil rights statutes,2 Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Fees Act)' thereby ensur-
ing that the cost of legal counsel would not deter plaintiffs with legiti-
mate grievances from filing suit. The Fees Act provides that courts
"may allow the prevailing party. . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs"'4 to be paid by the losing party.5 In practice, lower courts
I See infra text accompanying notes 56-58. See generally text accompanying notes 46-48.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 56-58. See generally text accompanying notes 46-48.
3 The Fees Act states in relevant part:
In any action or proceeding -to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.],
or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a rea-
sonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, 2641, as
amended by the Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 205(c), 94 Stat. 2325, 2330
(1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980)).
For a description of the statutes to which the Fees Act expressly applies, see Note, Promoting
the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 346 n.3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Vindication of Civil Rights]. See generally E.R. LARSON,
FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES (1981); 1 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, COURT
AWARDED FEES IN "PUBLIC INTEREST" LITIGATION (1978); Berkovitz, A Summary of Issues In-
volving Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights Cases, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 282 (1979); Derfner, One
Giant Step: The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, 21 ST. LOUIS U.LJ. 441 (1977);
Larson, The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 778
(1977); Lipson, Beyond Alyeska-Judidal Response to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Act, 22
ST. LOUIS U.LJ. 243 (1978); Malson, In Response to Alyeska-The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 21 ST. LOUIS U.LJ. 430 (1977); Note, The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 562 (1978); Comment, Attorney's Fees in Damage
Actions Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 332
(1980); Note, The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
205 (1977).
4 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980).
' The usual situation in the United States is that each litigant, victorious or not, pays for its
own attorney. This result has come to be known as the "American Rule" because of the contrast-
ing norm in England. Statutes such as the Fees Act are termed fee shifting statutes because they
reverse the American Rule by forcing the "losing" party to pay the "prevailing" party's attorney's
fees. See infra note 43.
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view fee awards as almost mandatory when plaintiffs prevail." Further-
more, to satisfy the "prevailing party" requirement, plaintiffs need to
achieve only some of their objectives7 "either through success on the
merits, through settlement, or merely through causing the defendants
voluntarily to undertake part of the relief sought."'
Computed at market rates unrelated to the amounts awarded to
plaintiffs,9 awards of statutory fees often prove very costly to defen-
dants. 10 To reduce their total liability in civil rights suits, defendants
frequently condition otherwise attractive settlement offers on the waiver
of attorneys' fees by plaintiffs. 1 Although a conditional settlement offer
places a plaintiff's counsel in a conflict between his interest in fees and
his client's interest in a satisfactory settlement, the current ethical
code 2 does not bar a defendant's counsel from making such an offer.'8
Furthermore, a plaintiff's counsel cannot ethically reject a conditional
settlement offer if his client prefers to accept it.' 4 A conditional settle-
ment offer thus demands "a benefit which the plaintiff's lawyer cannot
resist as a matter of ethics and which the plaintiff will not resist due to
lack of interest."' 5
This Comment adopts the view that conditional settlement offers
by defendants thwart the private enforcement of the civil rights laws."
Because the enforcement of the civil rights laws relies heavily on suits
' See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268, 1275 (5th Cir. 1980) (fees should be awarded
almost "as a matter of course"); E.R. LARSON, supra note 3, at 33 ("a prevailing plaintiff is
entitled to fees as a matter of course unless special circumstances would render an award unjust").
SSee, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 911 (1980). This issue is pending before the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 664
F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 455 U.S. 988 (1982) (No. 81-1244).
s E.R. LARSON, supra note 3, at 33; see H.R. REP. NO. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7
(1976); S. REP. NO. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5908, 5912.
1 See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the methods used by courts
to determine statutory fees awards.
'0 Statutory fees can exceed the damages awarded. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d
880, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en bane) ($33,000 recovery, $160,000 attorney's fees); Skoda v.
Fontani, 519 F. Supp. 309, 310 (N.D. Il. 1981) ($1 recovery, $6,086.12 attorney's fees).
" Request for fee waivers reportedly occur in more than half of the civil rights cases liti-
gated. Fee Waiver Requests Unethical: Bar Opinion, 68 A.B.A. J. 23 (1982) (quoting E. Richard
Larson, national staff counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union).
'2 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981).
's See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
"' See infra text following note 122. Lawyers are ethically bound to defer to their clients'
wishes with respect to settlements. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. But see infra text
accompanying notes 161-63.
"5 New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 80-94
(1981), reprinted in 36 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK 507, 508 (1981) [hereinafter cited as REC. A.B. CITY N.Y.]; see also Levin, Practical, Ethi-
cal and Legal Consideration Involved in the Settlement of Cases in which Statutory Attorney's
Fees are Authorized, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 515 (1980).
16 See infra text accompanying note 164.
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by private citizens, 17 many of whom are unable to afford the cost of
legal counsel, 18 Congress concluded that the awarding of statutory fees
is the only means available for certain citizens to finance their legal
representation.19 By enacting the Fees Act, Congress sought to guaran-
tee a viable pool of attorneys who, secure in their expectation of fees
from a successful action, will undertake to represent citizens in ob-
taining judicial enforcement of their rights under the civil rights laws.20
The routine bargaining away of statutory fees by plaintiffs who have
no financial interest in them, however, discourages lawyers from repre-
senting future clients who must rely on the Fees Act to finance their
legal representation. The goals of the Fees Act cannot be achieved if
attorneys decline to represent civil rights plaintiffs out of fear that they
will be uncompensated even when their clients prevail. Permitting con-
ditional settlement offers by defendants effectively removes many mem-
bers of the plaintiffs' civil rights bar from the scene and materially
quells the vigorous enforcement of the laws. Hence, although a condi-
tional settlement offer may provide relief to plaintiffs in a particular
case, its routine use threatens to leave future victims of civil rights vio-
lations without legal representation. Neither courts nor ethical codes
should permit the undermining of these congressionally favored rights.
After a brief overview of fee awards under the Fees Act, part I of
this Comment examines conditional settlement offers in light of Con-
gress's policies in enacting the Fees Act and in light of emerging case
law. Part II discusses problems arising from evaluating the ethical pro-
priety of conditional settlement offers under the Code and analyzes an
opinion issued by the Ethics Committee of 'the New York City Bar
Association condemning such offers. Part III proposes a rule by which
courts can shield plaintiffs' lawyers from coercive conditional settlement
offers without precluding defendants from obtaining the information
necessary for them to assess their liability from statutory fees.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 46-48, 59-60 & 134-37.
" See infra text accompanying notes 49, 55 & 134-37.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 46-48.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 46-48 & 56-60. By creating a method whereby attor-
neys undertaking representation in civil rights suits will be compensated if the suit prevails, Con-
gress took a great step toward effectiv: enforcement of the civil rights laws. First, more attorneys
will be willing to undertake civil rights suits if they know they will be compensated if the suit
prevails. Thus, there will be more persons available to enforce the civil rights laws. This is a very
important factor when it is considered that the government has limited authority and resources to
enforce civil rights statutes. See infra text accompanying note 46. The increased number of attor-
neys willing to enforce civil rights laws also acts as a deterrent because it increases the chances of a
violator being detected and sued. Second, the prospect of attorneys' fees is an effective deterrent of
civil rights violations especially because merely injunctive relief often imposed for a violation does
not entail direct economic costs on the defendant sufficient to deter future violations. This factor
can be formidable, see supra note 10.
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I. CONDITIONAL SETTLEMENT OFFERS: CONGRESSIONAL
SILENCE AND JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY
A. Background: Fee Awards
The Fees Act authorizes an award of fees to "the prevailing
party."2 Although both plaintiffs and defendants are eligible for statu-
tory fees, a prevailing defendant is entitled to attorneys' fees only if the
plaintiff's law suit was brought in bad faith or for harassment pur-
poses,22 or was clearly frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.23 A pre-
vailing plaintiff, on the other hand, is entitled to statutory fees as a
matter of course "unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust."2 Among proffered "special circumstances," a defen-
dant's good faith,25 a plaintiff's demonstrated ability to pay his attor-
ney's fees, 26 and representation of a plaintiff for free by a public inter-
est lawyer2 7 have all been rejected as grounds for denying statutory fees
to a prevailing plaintiff.28
To be deemed a "prevailing party," 29 a plaintiff needs to achieve
only some of its objectives either through success on the merits,30
through settlement,$" or merely through prompting the defendant vol-
untarily to undertake part of the relief sought.3 2 A plaintiff is entitled
21 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980).
2' See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 8, at 7; S. REP. NO. 1011, supra note 8, at 5,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912; E.R. LARSON, supra note 3, at 85.
" See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) (citing Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
(1978)); E.R. LARSON, supra note 3, at 85-86, 92. Courts treat a defendant, or defendant inter-
venor, enforcing rights protected by a statute as a plaintiff, however, for purposes of awarding
fees. See, e.g., Ridell v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1980); E.R. LARSON,
supra note 3, at 42-44.
t Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968), quoted in H.R. REP. NO.
1558, supra note 8, at 6; and in S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 8, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912.
" See, e.g., Hutton v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Love v. Mayor of Cheyenne, 620 F.2d
235 (10th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1979); Mid-Hudson Legal
Servs., Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1978).
"* See, e.g., International Oceanic Enters., Inc. v. Menton, 614 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1980);
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Collins, 609 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1980).
' See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 71 n.9 (1980) (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 1558, supra note 8, at 5, 8 n.16); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1980);
Northross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980);
Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979).
" For other alleged "special circumstances" that have been rejected as grounds for denying
statutory fees to prevailing plaintiffs, see E.R. LARSON, supra note 3, at 45-50.
See generally E.R. LARSON, supra note 3, at 33-97.
s See, e.g., Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981); Bagby v. Beal, 606
F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979); Naudeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).
31 See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 8, at 5,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5912).
" See, e.g., Dayan v. Board of Regents, 620 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980); Dawson v. Pastrick,
600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Andersen,
569 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1977); c. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.
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to a fees award upon prevailing on statutory grounds,"3 whether in fed-
eral or state court.3' Furthermore, the eleventh amendment does not
bar an award of fees against a state or its officials.
3 5
The federal courts of appeal have adopted different methods of
computing statutory fees. No circuit, however, presently adheres to a
simplistic percentage of recovery method.36 The circuits generally agree
as to the factors that should be considered in computing fees," giving
particular attention to the hours of work claimed by the attorney and to
his customary billing rate.38 The varying approaches to fee computation
differ only as to the guidance provided to the lower courts about how
the factors are to be applied.39
B. Conditional Settlement Offers and the Congressional Goal of
Private Enforcement of Civil Rights
The plain language and legislative history of the Fees Act are si-
lent with respect to conditional settlement offers; they neither expressly
condone nor prohibit the practice. 40 It is thus appropriate to consider
1970) (plaintiff is entitled to fees because his lawsuit acted as a "catalyst" prompting defendant to'
seek compliance with the requirements of Title VII), cited in H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 8,
at 7; and in S. REP. NO. 1011, supra note 8, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5912.
" See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
= See id.
See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); see also Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
Cf, e.g., Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1980) (reversing a trial court's award
of fees limited to half the damage recovery).
37 "Both the Johnson approach and the lodestar method utilize virtually the same factors."
E.R. LARSON, supra note 3, at 136. The twelve Johnson factors include, inter alia, the time and
labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skill needed to present the
case, and the customary fee for similar work. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (Title VII), cited in H. R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 8, at 8; and in S.
REP. NO. 1011, supra note 8, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913.
Whereas the Johnson approach merely lists the factors a trial court must consider in determining
a fees award, the lodestar method provides "a procedure for ordering the examination of factors."
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 682 (N.D. Cal. 1974), af'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). Under the lodestar method, courts multiply
the number of compensable hours by an appropriate billing rate and then adjust this sum-the
lodestar-in light of the contingent nature of success and the quality of the attorney's work. See
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d
Cir. 1973) (antitrust); see also Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(Title VII); Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473
(1981).
" See supra note 37.
39 See E.R. LARSON, supra note 3, at 136; d. Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624
F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1980) (antitrust) (holding that the Johnson factors are best applied in a man-
ner almost identical to the lodestar method).
40 Examination of the Fees Act's legislative history is otherwise complicated by the unusual
manner in which it was enacted. For a discussion of the enactment of the House and Senate bills,
see Malson, supra note 3, at 432-36; Comment, Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees in Cases Resolved on
State Pendent and Federal Statutory Grounds, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 488, 495 n.34 (1981). Courts
have nevertheless relied on the Fees Act's legislative history and case law to interpret other fee
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whether permitting a defendant to insist on a waiver of statutory fees as
a condition of settling a civil rights suit is consistent with the Act's
purpose. This involves determining the "general aim or policy which
pervades a statute."
4'
Congress's enactment of the Fees Act was partly a response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society.4' In Alyeska, the Court held that, absent specific congressional
authorization, the federal courts lacked the equitable powers to award
attorneys' fees for cases brought in the public interest.43 Many per-
ceived Alyeska as "erect[ing] a formidable financial barrier against
those seeking access to Federal courts."'44 Congress thus sought to en-
sure effective access to the judicial system for those seeking redress
under the civil rights laws.4
5
Effective access to the courts by victims of civil rights violations is
made more important because of the government's limited authority
and resources to enforce civil rights statutes.46 The enforcement of the
shifting statutes. See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 70-71 n.9 (1980)
(Title VII); Gram v. Bank of La., 691 F.2d 728, 729-30 (5th Cir. 1982) (Truth in Lending Act);
Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 244-55 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Voting Rights Act); d. E.R.
LARSON, supra note 3, at 6 (the Fees Act's legislative history "also is useful in interpreting similar
fee-shifting statutes") (footnote omitted).
41 Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HAtv. L. REV. 370, 370
(1947); see also Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of'Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca-
nons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400-01 (1950):
If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed
purpose ....
But... its language is [often] called upon to deal with circumstances utterly
uncontemplated at the time of its passage. Here the quest is not properly for the
sense originally intended by the statute, for the sense sought originally to be put
into it, but rather for the sense which can be quarried out of it in the light of the
new situation. Broad purposes can indeed reach far beyond details known or know-
able at the time of the drafting. . . . [Tihe sound quest [for a statute's policy] does
not run primarily in terms of historical intent. It runs in terms of what the words
can be made to bear, in making sense in the light of the unforeseen.
42 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
43 In Alyeska, a coalition of environmental groups prevailed in its suit against those responsi-
ble for constructing the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. The plaintiffs sought fees under the "private
attorney general" exception to the "American Rule"-that litigants pay their own attorneys' fees,
see id. at 240-62-which had been employed by several courts of appeals. The Court, however,
held that "it would be inappropriate for the Judiciary, without legislative guidance, to reallocate
the burdens of litigation." Id. at 247. Rather, the Court noted "that the circumstances under
which attorneys' fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those
awards are matters for Congress to determine." Id. at 262.
For a brief discussion and comparison of the American and European rules concerning attor-
neys fees, see Vindication of Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 347-50; Comment, supra note 40, at
488-89 n.1.
44 122 CoNG. REc. 31,471 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
45 See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 8, at 1 (the Fees Act "is designed to give [victims of
civil rights violations] effective access to the judicial process ...
46 See id.
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civil rights laws thus depends heavily upon "private attorneys general":
suits brought by private citizens in which "an attorney is a practical
necessity."14 7 Prior to Alyeska, suits by private attorneys general had
resulted in the "vigorous enforcement of modern civil rights legislation,
while at the same time limiting the growth of the [government's] en-
forcement bureaucracy. "48
Yet, Congress noted that "a vast majority of the victims of civil
rights violations cannot afford legal counsel."'49 Of course, in a case
involving a damage award, the attorney may arrange a contingency fee
agreement with the plaintiff. Under such an arrangement, the attorney
would receive a certain percentage of the court awarded damages.50
Some civil rights statutes, however, preclude damage awards, allowing
only injunctive relief.51 Moreover, Congress noted that even in a situa-
tion in which a damage award is the appropriate remedy, such an
award may be "preclude[d] or severely limit[ed]" because of immunity
doctrines if the civil rights violator is a state or local government en-
tity.52 The costs of civil rights suits thus "frequently outrun the eco-
nomic benefits ultimately obtained by successful litigants."5' Injunctive
relief and immunity doctrines necessarily restrict the civil rights attor-
ney's ability to arrange a contingency fee arrangement with the client.5
4
Inability to arrange for fee payment forces the victims of civil rights
violations to abandon their claims "because they cannot shoulder the
47 Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1970).
4s S. REP. NO. 1011, supra note 8, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5908, 5911.
4 H.R. REP. NO. 1558, supra note 8, at 1; see also S. REP. NO. 1011, supra note 8, at 2,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5910.
50 See generally F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964).
For example, the Senate Report notes that a plaintiff bringing an action under tite II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may obtain injunctive relief only. S. REP. NO. 1011, supra note 8, at
3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5910. In discussing the House version
of the Fees Act the House Report states that "in a large number of cases brought under the
provisions covered by H.R. 15460, only injunctive relief is sought, and prevailing plaintiffs should
ordinarily recover their counsel fees." H.R. REP. NO. 1558, supra note 8, at 9.
52 H.R. REP. NO. 1558, supra note 8, at 9.
53 122 CONG. REC. 31,472 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); see also id. at 33,314 (remarks
of Sen. Kennedy) ("often no large promise of monetary recovery lies at the end of the tunnel").
Senator Kennedy was a principal sponsor of the Fees Act legislation. See id. at 31,471 (Kennedy
substitute for Tunney bill); e. id. at 31,850 (amendment by Sen. Allen to entitle the bill the
"Tunney-Kennedy Civil Rights Attorneys Relief Act of 1976").
I Cf id. at 33,314 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy): "civil rights cases-unlike tort or antitrust
cases-do not provide the prevailing plaintiff with a large recovery from which he can pay his
lawyer." Moreover, the limited resources of public interest organizations do not allow them to
litigate all the worthy suits that come to their attention. See generally COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC IN.
TEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN
AMERICA (1976); Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
301 (1973); Note, Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 7 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 381 (1971).
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full costs of vindicating their rights.""5
By enacting the Fees Act, Congress sought to remove the most sig-
nificant barrier to legal representation against those victims of civil
rights violations seeking access to federal courts: payment of attorney
fees. "The entire purpose of the [Fees Act] was to ensure that the rep-
resentation of important national concerns would not depend upon the
charitable instincts of a few generous attorneys.1 56 The House Report
on the Fees Act, for example, states:
The Committee also received evidence that private lawyers
were refusing to take certain types of civil rights cases be-
cause the civil rights bar, already short of resources, could
not afford to do so. Because of the compelling need demon-
strated by the testimony, the Committee decided to report
[the Fees Act bill].
Statements made during the Senate debate on the Fees Act further sup-
port the position that Congress viewed providing private citizens with
the financial means with which to secure legal counsel in civil rights
suits as the cornerstone of the Fees Act.58 Congress viewed private at-
torneys' expectation of fees when successful in their representation of
clients-whether by settlement or otherwise-as the essential element
of the Fees Act's private enforcement scheme. Not to award counsel
fees would be "tantamount to repealing" the civil rights statutes them-
selves by frustrating their basic purpose.5 The national importance of
the rights being litigated compels the awarding of fees.60
Congress thus found that entitlement to statutory attorneys' fees
122 CONG. REC. 31,472 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 638 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
911 (1980).
57 H.R. REP. NO. 1558, supra note 8, at 3; cF. S. REP. NO. 1011, supra note 8, at 6, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913 ("If the cost of private enforcement
actions becomes too great, there will be no private enforcement. If our civil rights laws are not to
become mere hollow pronouncements which the average citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain
the traditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in these cases.").
See 122 CONG. REC. 31,471 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Mathias) ("The goal of S. 2278 is
clear and compelling-to insure that the high cost of litigation does not bar the Federal courts to
citizens who seek to enforce their rights under our civil rights laws."); id. at 33, 313 (remarks of
Sen. Tunney) ("Private citizens must be given not only the rights to go to court, but also the legal
resources .... Attorneys' fees have proved one extremely effective way to provide these equal
legal resources .... ).
89 S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 8, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5908, 5910 (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973)).
40 See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 633 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 911 (1980); cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 264 (1975)
("[flf any statutory policy is deemed so important that its enforcement must be encouraged by
awards of attorneys' fees, how could a court deny attorneys' fees to private litigants in actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to vindicate constitutional rights?" (emphasis in original)).
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was an essential prerequisite to enforcement of our civil rights laws.
Hence, the clear public policy is to discourage practices that interfere
with the awarding of attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Yet, condi-
tional settlements provide relief to plaintiffs in individual cases only by
securing a waiver of any entitlement to statutory fees. Furthermore,
although plaintiffs' counsel in some situations may offer voluntarily to
waive any claim to statutory fees, most conditional settlement offers are
initiated by defendants."1 Given plaintiffs' counsels' ethical obligation to
seek the best relief for their clients,"2 conditional settlement offers by
defendants effectively bar ethical lawyers from ever recovering statutory
fees in civil rights cases."3 Finally, conditional settlement offers are
most likely in those situations where Congress intended statutory fees to
be most beneficial to civil rights plaintiffs: cases where small monetary
damages or only nonpecuniary relief is available."
C. Conditional Settlement Offers and the Courts
No federal court has expressly prohibited conditional settlement
offers. 5 In James v. Home Construction Co.," the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit observed in dictum that Congress could not
have intended for a plaintiff to bargain away his attorney's claim to a
statutory fees award.67 The court noted that the award of attorneys'
fees is "a critical and integral part" of Congress's scheme of effective
enforcement of federal laws by private citizens without government in-
tervention.68 "In order to effectuate this scheme, attorneys who bring
[suits under private attorney general statutes] should be secure in their
61 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
62 See infra text accompanying notes 104-07.
But see infra text accompanying notes 161-63.
See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
U Simultaneous negotiations of the merits of the suit and attorneys' fees, however, have been
prohibited thereby barring conditional settlement offers. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying
text
- 689 F.2d 1357 (11th Cir. 1982).
"9 See id. at 1359. In holding that the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Pub. L. No 90-321, 82
Stat. 146 (1968), amended by Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1126 (1970) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.), "creates a right of action for attorneys to seek fee awards after settlement of
the plaintiff's claim," 689 F.2d at 1359, the court stated that "it is the attorney who is entitled to
fee awards in a TILA case, not the client." Id. at 1358. TILA's provision for attorneys' fees states
in relevant part:
[A]ny creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this part
with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the
sum of- (3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability
...the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined
by the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976).
" 689 F.2d at 1359.
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expectation of fees from a successful action . ... "0 Conditional settle-
ment offers, however, "thwart both the statute's private enforcement
scheme and its remedial objectives."
70
The only case to date where a plaintiff's counsel has resisted a
defendant's insistence on waiver of fees by filing a motion with the
court during settlement negotiations is Chattanooga Branch of the
NAACP v. City of Chattanooga."1 In Chattanooga NAACP, plaintiffs
filed suit challenging certain rezoning plans as racially discrimina-
tory.72 During settlement negotiations, plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion
petitioning the court to prohibit defendants from insisting that counsel
waive statutory fees as part of the settlement on the merits. The court
declined, instead directing the parties to resume negotiations. The court
further instructed plaintiffs' counsel to act in the clients' interest and
made clear to all counsel that disagreement over fees should not pre-
empt settlement. Plaintiffs' counsel waived fees and all parties entered
into a consent decree. Plaintiffs' counsel subsequently sought to set
aside only that provision of the consent decree waiving statutory fees.
7 '
Defendants opposed the motion for fees and alternatively moved to set
aside the entire consent decree if the fee waiver was declared unenforce-
able.7' The court denied plaintiffs' motion for fees stating that the con-
sent decree should stand in its entirety. 5
" Id.
70 Id.
"' No. 79-2111 (D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 1981), appeal dismissed, Nos. 82-5016/5013 (6th Cir.
Apr. 29, 1982). The facts set forth were gleaned from Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1-11,
Chattanooga Branch of NAACP v. City of Chattanooga, Nos. 82-5016/5013 (6th Cir. dismissed
Apr. 29, 1982).
" This multiparty action was brought by the local NAACP branch and three lower income
black women ("minority plaintiffs"), housing developer plaintiffs, and the National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing, Inc., (NCDH), against municipal and federal defendants.
The prayer for relief included requests for damages for the developers, declaratory and injunctive
relief for all plaintiffs, and attorneys' fees.
"' The dispute over statutory fees after entry of the consent decree was solely between the
parties obtaining only nonpecuniary relief (i.e., minority plaintiffs and NCDH) and their counsel,
and the defendants.
71 See Brief of the Montgomery County Fair Housing Center as Amicus Curiae at 4, Chat-
tanooga Branch of NAACP v. City of Chattanooga, Nos. 82-5016/5013 (6th Cir. dismissed Apr.
29, 1982).
7 Minority plaintiffs, NCDH, and their counsel appealed the trial court's denial of statutory
fees. Defendants filed a cross-appeal seeking to set aside the entire consent decree in the event that
the provision waiving statutory fees were set aside and in support of the district court's denial of
fees. Both appeals were voluntarily dismissed.
The same factor that effectively coerced the waiver of fees-the risk of losing federal funds as
relief-may have also coerced the plaintiffs to withdraw their appeal. The most adequate remedy
in discriminatory land use, fair housing cases is housing units rather than mere damages. See Brief
of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22 nn.13-14, Chattanooga NAACP. The federal defendant agreed in
the consent decree to preserve funds from its budget for fiscal year 1981 to guarantee rent subsi-
dies for the developers' housing project. See id. at 21. Had the entire consent decree been set aside,
these funds could have been recaptured by the defendant and "lost forever to the developers' pro-
ject in Chattanooga." See id. at 22. The risk of having the entire consent decree set aside may have
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In contrast to the Tennessee District Court's ruling in Chattanoo-
ga NAACP, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that
the policies underlying the Fees Act override the interest in enforce-
ment of the terms of a private agreement barring a plaintiff's attorneys
from requesting or accepting statutory fees.76 In Shadis v. Beal,77 the
court affirmed a lower court's refusal to enforce a provision in a fund-
ing contract between plaintiff's lawyers' legal services program and the
defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The contractual provision
purported to bar awards of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs in litigation
against the state. The lower court recognized precisely what renders
such agreements contrary to public policy: "If such agreements were
enforceable, the entity. or person could programmatically require such
agreements from any number of lawyers with whom it deals, thus di-
minishing the scope and vitality of the inducement Congress wished to
create."1
78
Conditional settlement offers are possible only during simultane-
ous negotiations of attorneys' fees with the settlement of the substantive
dispute between the parties. In Prandini v. National Tea Co.,7 1 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expressly directed its trial
courts to insist upon settlement of the merits of the case separately from
the award of statutory fees.80 Only after court approval of a settlement
on the merits should discussion and negotiation of "appropriate com-
pensation for the attorneys begin."81 Two other courts of appeal, the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, also have expressed disfavor for simultane-
ous negotiations.
82
thus coerced plaintiffs to withdraw their appeal from the denial of fees.
70 See Shadis v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 300 (1982).
77 Id.
78 Shadis v. Beal, 520 F. Supp. 858, 864 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1981), af'd, 685 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 300 (1982).
557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977). Prandini was a class action employment discrimination suit
seeking damages and injunctive relief.
" See id. at 1021. For a critical view of Prandini, see Levin, supra note 15, at 516-17; Note,
Attorney's Fees-Conflicts Created by the Simultaneous Negotiation and Settlement of Damages
and Statutorily Authorized Attorneys' Fees in a Tide VII Class Action, 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 799
(1978).
s1 557 F.2d at 1021. In Prandini, the court's concern was the apparent conflict of interest
posed by "sweetheart contracts," i.e., a defendant's proffer of generous attorneys' fees to plaintiff's
counsel in tacit exchange for a small recovery or other remedial concessions. See id. at 1021 & n.7.
Yet, whether proposed settlements make extremely generous or totally inadequate provisions for
plaintiffs' counsels' remuneration, they raise conflict of interest problems which can arise only in
simultaneous negotiations.
,2 See Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 651 F.2d 574, 582 & n.10 (8th
Cir. 1981) (simultaneous negotiations place counsel "in the position of negotiating a fee ultimately
destined for his pocket at the same time that all thoughts ought to be singlemindedly focused on
the client's interests," ;d. at 582; "it is preferable to avoid any appearance of impropriety even if
an agreement on fees may be 'easily accomplished,'" id. at 582 n.10); Mendoza v. United States,
623 F.2d 1338, 1353 (9th Cir. 1980) ("we strongly discourage the simultaneous negotiation of
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If followed by trial courts, the Prandini bifurcated approach to
settlement negotiations theoretically removes any opportunity for defen-
dants to make conditional settlement offers. Yet, that approach also
presents problems. 8 First, enforcement of the Prandini rule is diffi-
cult," even in class action suits where the court must approve all settle-
ments.8 5 The court, for example, ordinarily cannot know whether the
parties have had discussions on fee matters. The rule's "net result
might be to increase informal agreements among counsel or to en-
courage withholding agreements on fees from the judge until after the
settlement is approved." 86 Nevertheless, the rule would assist litigants
petitioning the court to prohibit opposing counsel from insisting on
waiver of fees as a condition of settlement.8"
Second, the Prandini rule may actually inhibit favorable settlement
offers. 8 "By preventing [pre-judgment] agreements on fees, [Prandinil
makes it difficult for the defendant to ascertain precisely what its liabil-
ity will be under a proposed settlement, eliminating the very certainty
that makes settlement attractive to the defendant."" Unless a defendant
can determine the likely size of a plaintiff's counsel's fee request, a
litigant strictly adhering to Prandini may risk preempting settlement. 0
attorneys' fees and substantive issues in class action settlement negotiations"); see also Monel v.
Department of Social Serv., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mufioz
v. Arizona State Univ., 80 F.R.D. 670,-671-72 (D. Ariz. 1978); Lyon v. Arizona, 80 F.R.D. 665,
669 (D. Ariz. 1978); Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451 (E.D. Ill. 1978). But see White v.
New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 705 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[nlor ... do we
see anything wrong with requiring the parties to face up to the issue of fees in their settlement
negotiations"), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
Responses by judges and lawyers to a questionnaire prepared by the Federal Judicial Center
reveals "a tendency on the part of the judges to agree with the [Prandini] decision and an even
stronger agreement by attorneys, with about half the judges [51.9%] and over half the attorneys
[65.6%] indicating agreement." A. MILLER, ATrORNEYS' FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS 224 (1980).
Attorneys still agreed with Prandini when their responses were broken down according to whether
the attorney represented mainly plaintiffs or defendants, 65.0% and 59.4% respectively. Id.
83 See A. MILLER, supra note 82, at 222.
8Id.
85 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
88 A. MILLER, supra note 82, at 222. Enforcement of the Prandini effort to remove ethical
conflicts from settlement negotiations is a problem only when defendant proffers extremely gener-
ous fees. When defendant makes totally inadequate provision for counsel's fees, plaintiff's counsel
is likely to bring defendant's simultaneous discussion of merits and fees to the court's attention. See
supra text following note 72.
87 For example, had the parties in Chattanooga NAACP, see supra notes 71-75 and accom-
panying text, been litigating in a jurisdiction that followed Prandini, theoretically either defen-
dants would have refrained from making conditional settlement offers or the trial judge, when
requested by plaintiffs, would have been obliged to instruct defendants to cease insisting on a
waiver of fees as a condition of settlement. But compare infra note 90 for a discussion of
Prandini's actual effect on settlement negotiations in the Third Circuit.
" A. MILLER, supra note 82, at 222; c. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 1183, 1207 (1982) (refusal to discuss fees until agreement on all other issues is final "is
not necessarily in anyone's interest if it inhibits favorable settlement offers").
" A. MILLER, supra note 82, at 222.
90 [A] defendant with good prospects for escaping any significant adverse judgment
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In a recent case, White v. New Hampshire Department of Em-
ployment Security,91 petitioner and amid urged the United States Su-
preme Court to adopt a rule deferring any fee negotiations until after
entry of a judgment on the merits.92 The Court, although noting that it
was "sensitive" to the conflict of interests problem posed by simultane-
ous negotiation of the merits and attorneys' fees,9" declined to decide
the issue at bar 94 on the grounds urged by petitioner and amici, stating
that:
In considering whether to enter a negotiated settlement, a
defendant may have good reason to demand to know his total
may be willing to settle only if he knows that his total liability, including fees, will
be less than the costs of defending the case. If the potential attorney's award is
substantial and uncertain, the defendant may prefer to go to trial.
Rhode, supra note 88, at 1207 n.95.
Professor Miller observed that the potential disincentive to settle caused by strict adherence to
Prandini "can be alleviated somewhat by allowing plaintiff's attorney to provide information as to
the likely size of the request, perhaps through the judge, so defendants could accurately estimate
their liability." A. MILLER, supra note 82, at 223.
To ascertain better Prandini's impact on settlement negotiations, the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review conducted telephone interviews with several district court judges in the
Third Circuit. (Interview notes are on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.) All
the judges interviewed agreed that defendants want to know their total liability from both damages
and fees. The judges believe that if a defendant does not know the full extent of its liability, it is
not likely to settle. The judges have thus tried to accommodate defendants' concern by tolerating
and even encouraging the litigants to discuss the information necessary for a defendant to calculate
the "lodestar" figure, i.e., plaintiff's counsel's compensable hours and billing rate. See supra note
37. One judge even suggested that a court could require plaintiff's counsel to provide his cumula-
tive timesheet to the defendant. Having calculated the lodestar figure, defendant can estimate the
likely range of the fees award.
Most judges believed that the litigants' full disclosure to the court of their ongoing simultane-
ous discussions of the merits and fees satisfied the spirit of Prandini. Full disclosure permits the
court to ferret out any existing conflict of interest problems and avoids the appearance of impro-
priety without inhibiting favorable settlement offers. A plaintiff's lawyer may even voluntarily
reduce the number of compensable hours claimed as an incentive for defendant to settle. Curi-
ously, none of the judges interviewed had ever been requested to enforce Prandini by instructing a
defendant not to discuss fees simultaneously with the merits of the case.
Finally, some of the judges interviewed suggested that White v. New Hampshire Dep't of
Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982), see infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text, may have
modified or overruled Prandini.
'l 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
IS See id. at 453-54 n.15. In its brief, for example, the United States concluded that "detailed
fee discussions should ordinarily be conducted after agreement on the merits has been reached"
because the attorney in a civil rights action "may have an interest adverse to his client if the
question of the size of his fees [award] becomes part of the settlement negotiation." Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 11-12 (note and citations omitted) White.
"' Lump sum settlement offers, where a defendant "remain[s] indifferent as to [the settle-
ment's] distribution as 'damages' or 'attorney's fees,'" was the conflict of interests problem to
which the Court was sensitive. See 455 U.S. at 454 n.15. The ethical conflict arises because "[in
pursuing negotiations.., the lawyer must decide what allocation to seek as between lawyer and
client" Id.
The specific issue before the court in White was whether a postjudgment motion for statu-
tory fees must be filed within the 10-day timelines standard of Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See id. at 446-47.
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liability from both damages and fees. Although such situa-
tions may raise difficult ethical issues for a plaintiff's attor-
ney, we are reluctant to hold that no resolution is ever avail-
able to ethical counsel.
95
From the cases discussed, it is evident that the courts are still
struggling to find a solution to the dilemma facing a plaintiff's attorney
when confronted with a conditional settlement offer. Resort to judicial
decisions is thus largely unhelpful in such a situation. As will be seen
in the next section, the attorney ethical standards set forth in the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility" are also deficient in solving the
problem.
II. ETHICAL RULES AND CONDITIONAL SETTLEMENT OFFERS
A. The American Bar Association's View of
Professional Responsibility
1. Generally
The American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility ("Code")" sets forth the standards of conduct98 by which
the legal profession governs itself.9 A fundamental premise underlies
the Code's standards: lawyers best serve the public interest when they
faithfully,100 competently, 101 and lawfully0 2 represent the private inter-
" Id. at 454 n.15.
" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981).
97 The Code replaced the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics in 1969.
The Canons, adopted in 1908, were the ABA's first codification of ethical rules.
" The Code comprises canons, ethical considerations (EC's), and disciplinary rules (DR's).
"Strictly speaking, each canon is only the headline to each part of the Code, but the word is more
commonly used to stand for the headline and the aggregation of ethical considerations and discipli-
nary rules that follow." Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest ini the Legal Profession,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1248 n.8 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Conflicts]. "The
Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which
every member of the profession should strive." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1981). "The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id. The first
number after the EC's or DR's indicates which canon the ethical consideration or disciplinary rule
elaborates.
" Every state except California has adopted the Code without substantial modification.
Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV.
689, 690 n.9 (1981). Moreover, courts in every state except Maine and Mississippi have adopted
the Code as a court rule thereby giving it the force of law. Developments-Conflicts, supra note
98, at 1249. Local courts and bar ethics committees formally enforce the Code through discipli-
nary proceedings. There has been, however, "little empirical investigation regarding compliance
with professional standards. . . ." Rhode, supra, at 708.
100 See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1981) ("A Law-
yer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client").
101 See generally id. Canon 7 ("A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the
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ests of their clients.103 Hence, an attorney's professional duty under the
Code is almost exclusively to his clients."" Neither the attorney's own
interests 05 nor those of third parties 08 should be permitted to compro-
mise an attorney's loyalty to his clients.
10 7
A lawyer may nevertheless propose an action that might be incon-
sistent with the client's best interests if the lawyer deems the expected
outcome to be morally just.108 The lawyer must, however, defer to the
client's wishes on matters affecting the merits of a legal action.109
Hence, the Code states that "the decision whether to forego legally
available objectives or methods because of nonlegal factors is ultimately
for the client and not for [the lawyerl."'1 The lawyer's inclusion of
societal factors .in advice to a client thus arises from the lawyer's re-
sponsibility to assist the client in reaching an appropriate decision 1 '
rather than from any duty generally to society."'
Bounds of the Law").
102 See generally id.
"' Krash, Professional Responsibility to Clients and the Public Interest: Is There a Con-
flict?, 55 CHI. B. REC. 31, 31 (Special Centennial Issue 1974); see also F.R. MARKS, K. LESWING
& B.A. FORTINSKY, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, at 9-10
(1972) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as MARKS & LESWING]:
[The lawyer] is interested solely in seeing to it that the interest of the party he
represents is as ably advanced as is humanly and professionally possible. . .. In
short, the traditional lawyer has seen himself as serving the public interest by sim-
ply doing his daily job of representing only one side of a controversy. In fact, he
reasons that if he does anything but serve the singular interests of his clients he is
disserving the public interest.
But c. L. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 318, 323 (1914), quoted in MARKS & LESWING,
supra, at 29 ("[Leaders of the bar] have erroneously assumed that the rule of ethics to be applied
to a lawyer's advocacy is the same where he acts for private interests against the public as it is in
litigation between private iifdividuals.").
10 See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text for exceptions to this general rule.
o See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-2 to 5-13 (1981).
104 See id. EC 5-14 to 5-24.
Id. EC 5-1. See generally Developments-Conflicts, supra note 101.
108 "In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to
point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissi-
ble." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981) (footnote omitted). See also
Developments-Conflicts, supra note 101, at 1459 (An attorney may "advise his client to take
account of broader interests and to refuse any settlement that perpetuates a social evil.").
1'8 "IT]he authority to make decisions [affecting the merits of the cause] is exclusively that of
the client and . . . such decisions are binding on his lawyer." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1981).
110 Id. EC 7-8.
,1 See supra note 108.
1S See Cox, The Lawyer's Independent Calling, 67 KY. L.J. 5, 13, 15 (1978-1979):
The lawyer must constantly look to those interests of his client which a free society
allows the client to pursue, but he must also look to the needs of the larger common
enterprises in which the client is engaged-ultimately to the needs of the whole
human enterprise of which the client is a part. Often the two clash, either in truth
or because the client's interest, as perceived by the client, clashes with the lawyer's
but not the client's view of the public interest.
Plainly, it is for the client to choose after receiving the lawyer's advice. That
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Under the Code, however, a lawyer's zealous representation of his
client must remain within the confines of the law.1 ' A lawyer may
thus place refusal to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be
unlawful above the client's interests.11 Furthermore, an attorney's duty
to the court overrides his loyalty to the client.11 5 An attorney, for exam-
ple, must disclose to the court frauds perpetuated by a client upon the
tribunal 1 2 and controlling legal authority directly adverse to the client's
position.' 17 Moreover, the Code prohibits an attorney from acquiring a
financial interest in the outcome of a client's litigation"' because, if the
attorney's and client's interests coincide, the attorney's duties as an of-
ficer of the court may be compromised." 9
advice will be better service to the client's interest if the lawyer preserves the inde-
pendence necessary to look both to what the client thinks he wants and to the larger
interests of others whom the client's action will affect, including the general
public...
A client's true interests are seldom wholly aligned with the interess of
those with whom he deals, and they may not conform at all closely with what you
or I would take to be the general interest.
113 See supra note 102.
14 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(B)(2) (1981): "In his repre-
sentation of a client, a lawyer may. . .[riefuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to
be unlawful, even though there is some support for an argument that the conduct is legal."
"' See id. EC 7-19 to 7-33; c. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 7 (1951)
("A lawyer's duty to his client cannot rise higher than its source, which is the court.").
, A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a per-
son or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his
client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person
or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1981) (footnote omitted).
11 "In representing a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose. . .[liegal authority in
the controlling jurisdiction known to him to be directly adverse to the position of his client and
which is not disclosed by opposing counsel." Id. DR 7-106(B)(1) (footnotes omitted).
118 A lawyer shall not acquire a propietary interest in the cause of action or subject
matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that he may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses.
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
Id. DR 5-103(A) (footnotes omitted).
1I" Developments-Conflicts, supra note 98, at 1288. As one of two exceptions to this pro-
scription, the Code allows a lawyer to charge a fee contingent on the outcome of civil litigation.
See supra note 118. The Code permits this arrangement because it "may be the only practical way
for a client to finance adequate representation." Developments-Conflicts, supra note 98, at 1288.
Moreover, the Code protects this financial arrangement by not providing defendant's counsel with
any basis upon which to coerce plaintiff's counsel to waive his right to a contingent fee.
Statutory attorneys' fees may also be the only practical way for certain clients to finance their
legal representation. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. If the Code were to treat
contingency fee arrangements and statutory fees alike, it would also not provide defendant's coun-
sel with a basis upon which to coerce plaintiff's counsel to waive their claim to statutory fees. But
ef. infra text following note 122.
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2. Settlements
Most civil suits are settled out of court."'0 Under the Code, the
exclusive authority to decide whether to settle a suit resides with the
client, not with the attorney.121 Furthermore, a lawyer must advise a
client of settlement opportunities free of the lawyer's self-interests. 22
Consequently, an attorney must prevent fee-related considerations from
affecting his assessment of settlement opportunities if the client is to be
provided with disinterested and ethical legal representation. An attor-
ney's entitlement to statutory fees for successfully enforcing congressio-
nally favored rights does not diminish his duty to provide disinterested
counsel. A plaintiff's lawyer advising a client against settling a suit
solely because the defendant conditions a settlement offer on a waiver of
statutorily authorized attorneys' fees thus appears to engage in unethi-
cal conduct under the Code."'
The Code, however, fails to shield counsel from pressures-such
as conditional settlement offers-that could impair disinterested repre-
sentation. For instance, DR 2-108(B) requires an attorney to decline
from entering into "an agreement that restricts his right to practice
law. "12  Thus, plaintiff's counsel, as a condition of settlement, cannot
agree to refrain from representing other plaintiffs in future actions sim-
ilar to the one being settled.1 2 5 The Code seeks to bar such agreements
because they would induce a conflict between plaintiff's counsel's inter-
ests in his own practice and the client's interest in an adequate settle-
ment.126 Yet, the Code does not bar opposing counsel from making such
settlement offers; it merely bars plaintiff's counsel from agreeing to
them. 27 To address adequately practices the bar may otherwise seek to
110 "In the federal district courts, more than 90 percent of all civil cases. . . are terminated
short of trial." Kaufman, Judicial Reform in the Next Century, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1976)
(footnote omitted). For official statistics supporting this assertion, see ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 254-57 (1980). For a discus-
sion of factors which may lead parties to settle a suit rather than proceed with litigation, see Note,
An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REV. 67 (1969).
', "[I]t is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer. ... MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1981). See also supra note 109 and accompany-
ing text.
"2 See id. EC 5-2 to 5-13.
", But see infra text accompanying notes 161-63.
1,M "In connection with the settlement of a controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into
an agreement that restricts his right to practice law." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 2-108(B) (1981).
15 Cf. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1039 (1968) (a lawyer cannot
ethically sign an agreement that settles a client's litigation when the settlement contains a covenant
that the lawyer will not represent other plaintiffs against the defendant).
'" See New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op.
80-94 (1981), reprinted in 36 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y., supra note 15, at 507.
'" The Code approaches this type of conflict of interest problem by providing a lawyer with
an aid to resisting objectionable conduct rather than prohibiting the conduct itself. Cf Rhode,.
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proscribe, the Code needs to incorporate provisions focusing on defense
counsel's conduct.
B. The New York City Bar Association's Condemnation of
Conditional Settlement Offers
Only one bar ethics committee has taken steps to shield counsel
from the "severe dilemma" 128 posed by conditional settlement offers. In
September, 1981, the Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of
the New York City Bar Association ("Ethics Committee") issued an
opinion deeming it to be unethical for defendant's counsel to offer to
settle civil rights litigation in return for waiver of statutorily authorized
attorneys' fees. 129 The Ethics Committee observed that defendant's
counsel, in conditioning settlement on the waiver of the statutory fee,
"make[s] a demand for a benefit which the plaintiff's lawyer cannot
resist as a matter of ethics and which the plaintiff will not resist due to
lack of interest."130 The Ethics Committee deemed unethical defen-
dant's counsel's exploitation of this situation in civil rights and civil
liberties cases.131
The Ethics Committee's condemnation of conditional settlement
offers rested on a syllogistic analysis: 1) conditional settlement offers by
defendants' counsel "could seriously undermine" the effectiveness of
private efforts at enforcing the federal civil rights statutes;132 2) counsel
have an ethical duty not to undermine the enforcement of these stat-
utes; 33 therefore, 3) defendants' counsel have an ethical duty to refrain
from conditioning settlement offers on waiver of statutorily authorized
attorneys' fees.
The Ethics Committee relied on case law and the legislative his-
tory of the Fees Act as support for its first conclusion.'-' The cited
authority stated that the effective enforcement of the federal civil rights
laws depends heavily upon the litigation efforts of private citizens;135
that scarce financial resources prevent a majority of the victims of civil
supra note 99, at 709 (footnote omitted): "[Ethical] codes can help lawyers resist overreaching by
third parties. An attorney reluctant to invoke only his own moral intuitions in challenging a cli-
ent's or supervising lawyer's directives might find that code provisions afford more politic means of
registering objections."
12 New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 80-94
(1981), reprinted in 36 REC. A.B. CrY N.Y., supra note 15, at 508.
1 See id., reprinted in 36 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y., supra note 15, at 507.
Id., reprinted in 36 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y., supra note 15, at 508.
1 See id.
I d., reprinted in 36 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y., supra note 15, at 509.
133 Id., reprinted in 36 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y., supra note 15, at 509-10.
'. See id., reprinted in 36 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y., supra note 15, at 508-09.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
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rights violations from securing the requisite legal counsel to initiate liti-
gation;136 and that statutorily authorized attorneys' fees thus enable
these victims to bring their cases to the courts.1 37 The Ethics Committee
implicitly assumed that if plaintiffs' lawyers routinely were to waive
their claim to fees1"8 as a condition of obtaining favorable settlements
for their clients, the public interest bar would again refuse to represent
potential victims.139 Such an outcome, the Ethics Committee concluded,
would undermine the congressionally enacted scheme of private en-
forcement of the civil rights laws.
The Ethics Committee strained to find support in the Code for its
conclusion that defendants' counsel had an ethical duty not to under-
mine federal civil rights stautes by offering conditioned settlements. It
first cited DR 1-102(A)(5) which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not
. ..[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice."1 40 The Ethics Committee's reliance on this rule may have been
appropriate if attorneys owed a greater duty to the public interest than
to their clients.141 An attorney's professional duty under the Code, how-
ever, is primarily to the client.14 By offering a conditioned settlement,
a defendant's counsel merely seeks to further his client's interests
within the bounds of the law; defendant's counsel does not engage in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. In fact, a condi-
tioned settlement in an individual case arguably promotes the adminis-
tration of justice if the relief offered by the defendant to the plaintiff
terminates a violation of a civil rights statute. The conditioned settle-
ment provides the plaintiff with the desired relief, and does so more
efficiently than would proceeding to trial.
The Ethics Committee also relied on the Code's ethical considera-
2" See supra text accompanying notes 49 & 55.
137 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
I" The claim to statutory fees, however, may belong to the client rather than to the attorney.
See infra note 151 and accompanying text. But see infra text accompanying notes 153-54.
"' Prior to the enactment of the Fees Act many private lawyers had been "refusing to take
certain types of civil rights cases because the civil rights bar, already short of resources, could not
afford to do so." H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 8, at 3.
140 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1981).
141 A lawyer would then ethically be bound to place the interests underlying the Fees Act
above the interests of the client. Because conditional settlement offers undermine the continued
enforcement of the civil rights statutes, see supra text accompanying notes 60-64, defendant's
counsel would ethically be proscribed from making such offers. But see Developments-Conflicts,
supra note 98, at 1459-60 (footnote omitted) ("[T]here would be great danger in requiring indi-
vidual attorneys to override the wishes of their clients in accordance with their personal percep-
tions of legislative intent and the public interest, because those concepts are too nebulous to pro-
vide a standard for judging a lawyer's professional conduct.").
14* See supra text accompanying notes 104-107; c Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibil-
ities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 EMORY L.J. 747, 772 (1975) ("The notion that a
private attorney owes a duty to the public which overrides his duty to his client is alien to the
traditions and ethical standards of the legal profession." (footnote omitted)).
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dons. The Committee first condemned conditional settlement offers as
contrary to a lawyer's duty under EC 2-25 "to support efforts to make
counsel available to those unable to afford it."' 4 It then sought to but-
tress its conclusions by citing EC 7-14 which discourages government
counsel'" from using the government's economic power "to bring about
unjust settlements."'1 45 Yet, reliance on the notion of "unjust settle-
ment" to prove that conditional settlement offers are ethically wrong
begs the question. Only if conditional settlement offers were deemed
unjust would EC 7-14 urge government counsel to refrain from making
such offers. Canon 5,146 however, urges plaintiffs' attorneys to exercise
their own independent judgment in determining whether the defen-
dant's settlement offer affords satisfactory relief to the plaintiff. A con-
ditional settlement offer would not constitute an unjust settlement if it
afforded satisfactory relief to the plaintiff. Consequently, as long as the
defendant affords relief satisfactory to the plaintiff, EC 7-14 does not
admonish government counsel to refrain from making conditional set-
tlement offers.
In summary, the Ethics Committee recognized that the future vin-
dication of civil liberties under the Constitution and federal statutes de-
pends on the actual awarding of statutory attorneys' fees to counsel of
prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases. The Committee sought to
shield plaintiffs' lawyers from the conflict of interests induced by condi-
tional settlement offers by precluding "defendant[s'] lawyer[s] from
holding the settlement[s] of the merits hostage to . . . waiver[s] of the
statutory fee."' 47 The Committee's attempt to derive support from the
Code for its condemnation of this practice, however, does not bear up
under scrutiny. The Code, oriented toward fee paying clients and the
vindication of paying clients' rights without regard to the public inter-
"' New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 80-94
1981, reprinted in 36 REC. A.B. CrrY N.Y., supra note 15, at 510. EC 2-25 provides in part that
"[e]very lawyer should support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services [of those
unable to pay reasonable fees]." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1981).
144 Most defendants in civil rights suits are government officials or entities. See New York
City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 80-94 (1981), reprinted
in 36 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y., supra note 15, at 507; H.R. REP. NO. 1558, supra note 8, at 7. For
instance, section 1983 of 42 U.S.C. provides relief only against persons acting under color of state
law. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961).
'45 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1981).
146 "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client."
Id. Canon 5. One reason attorneys are ordinarily prohibited from acquiring a financial interest in
the outcome of the litigation they are conducting for their client, see id. DR 5-103(A), is the
"possibility of an adverse effect" upon a lawyer's exercise of free judgment on behalf of his client.
Id. EC 5-7.
I47 New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 80-94
(1981), reprinted in 36 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y., supra note 15, at 511.
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est,14S provides little support for the view that attorneys have an ethical
duty to refrain from conditioning settlement offers on waivers of statu-
tory fees.14
9
Ill. CONDITIONAL SETTLEMENT OFFERS AND THE JUDICIARY'S
ROLE IN FURTHERING THE GOALS OF THE FEES ACT
If a defendant insists on a waiver of statutory fees as a condition of
settlement, if the defendant's settlement offer otherwise satisfied the
plaintiff, and if neither the Code nor the trial court shields the plain-
tiff's counsel from the defendant's demand during settlement negotia-
tions, ethical counsel apparently has no choice but to yield to the fee
waiver on behalf of the client's best interests. As in Chattanooga
Branch of the NAACP v. City of Chattanooga,150 counsel's only judi-
cial means to challenge the propriety of a defendant's conduct may be a
postjudgment motion setting aside the fee waiver.
Yet, courts routinely characterize the entitlement to statutory fees
as belonging to the prevailing party, not to the lawyer.151 If the right to
the statutory fee belongs to the client rather than the lawyer, then the
lawyer cannot claim that a defendant's conditional settlement offer
placed him in a conflict of interest'52 nor may he proceed with a
postjudgment motion for fees without the client's consent. One federal
court of appeals, however, has clearly held that the right to fees is the
lawyer's, not the client's. 5s Moreover, almost every court that has con-
sidered the issue of entitlement to fees has recognized that a motion for
fees in a civil rights case, "although made in the name of the plaintiff,
148 See Developments-Conlicts, supra note 98, at 1446.
149 The extensive conflict-of-interests provisions of the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), the proposed successor to the Code, also fail to
shield counsel from conditional settlement offers. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rules 1.7 to 1.13 (Final Draft, August, 1982). Furthermore, the Model Rules preserve the notion
that attorneys serve the public interest when they zealously represent the private interests of their
clients. See, e.g., id. Preamble ("A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer
of the legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious.").
'" No. 79-2111 (D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 1981), appeal disnissed, Nos. 82-5016/13 (6th Cir. Apr.
29, 1982) (discussed supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text).
"'s See, e.g., Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[prevailing party is] enti-
tled to an award of attorney fees"); White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Empl. Sec., 629 F.2d 697,
705 (1st Cir. 1980) ("plaintiff's fees claim"), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
252 If the right to the statutory fee is the client's, then strictly speaking there is no attorney
interest in conflict with the client's: the client waives her or his right to file a motion for fees in
return for a settlement favorable to herself or himself. The Committee, however, stated that "the
distinction is at best theoretical because in the typical case only the lawyer has a practical interet
[sic] in the statutory fee." New York Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, For-
mal Op. 80-94 (1981), reprinted in 36 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. supra note 15, at 513 n.5 (citation
omitted).
153 James v. Home Constr. Co., 689 F.2d 1357 (11th Cir. 1982); see supra note 67.
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is really one by the attorney."' ' Especially where the plaintiff is under
no obligation to pay counsel or the recovery yields no funds to pay
counsel, the real party in interest in a motion for fees is the attorney.
Hence, the uniform practice of the federal courts, including the Su-
preme Court, is to direct payment of statutory attorneys' fees to the
lawyers themselves. 15 The fees awards are made directly to the lawyer
"to ensure against a windfall to the litigants." '
The potential for fee recovery is an important factor a lawyer con-
siders in deciding whether to represent a client otherwise unable to pay
for legal counsel.157 It encourages a lawyer to expend his limited re-
sources in litigation aimed at enforcing civil rights statutes. 58 Further-
more, the funds derived from a fees award may secure adequate repre-
sentation for the lawyer's future clients seeking enforcement of their
civil rights.1 59 Fee recovery thus enhances a lawyer's capabilities to as-
sist in enforcing congressionally secured individual rights."' Con-
versely, denial of fees restricts the lawyer's ability to represent other
clients subsequently seeking judicial relief. In routinely yielding to de-
fendants' conditional settlement offers, a lawyer effectively agrees not to
represent other persons financing their suits by means of the Fees Act
or other fee shifting statutes.
In some instances, then, a settlement agreement in which the law-
yer waives the claim to fees may be analogous to a covenant restricting
a lawyer's right to practice: in both the lawyer agrees not to represent a
certain class of clients. Although the express terms of the conditional
settlement agreement may merely require counsel to waive any entitle-
ment to statutory fees rather than agree not to represent other persons,
15 Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451 (N.D. Ill. 1978); see, e.g., Lipscomb v. Wise,
643 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1981); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Hairston v. R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090, 1092-93 (7th Cir.
1975); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974).
'" See, e.g., Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 126 (1980) (fees awarded to "respondents
counsel"); New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 70-71 n.9 (1980) (fees awards to
"public interest groups" are appropriate); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693 (1978) (appellate
fees were ordered to be paid "to counsel for the prevailing parties").
15 Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974); accord Miller v.
Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1970) ("the fees allowed are to reim-
burse and compensate for legal services rendered and will not go to the litigants"); see also Rodri-
guez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977); Hairston v. R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d
1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 1975).
15? "Public interest law firms" seeking tax exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976), may not, however, use "the likelihood or
probability of a fee award as a consideration in its selection of cases." Rev. Proc. 75-13, § 3, 1975-
1 C.B. 662; see Rev. Rul. 76-5, 1976-1 C.B. 146; Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975-1 C.B. 154.
'" See Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980).
'59 See Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 HARv. L. REV. 411, 414
(1973).
'" See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977).
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the effect of those terms may be the same: successfully representing the
client's interests in the settlement negotiations at issue necessarily en-
tails yielding to a settlement demand that curbs the lawyer's ability to
represent other clients. Both DR 1-108(B) 61 and its equivalent under
the proposed successor to the Code, Model Rule 5.5(b),162 however,
prohibit "a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in con-
nection with settling a claim on behalf of a client."1 ' Where agreeing
to a conditional settlement offer effectively precludes the lawyer from
subsequently representing clients dependent on a fee shifting statute,
yielding to a defendant's demand-even in the client's best inter-
est-may be contrary to the rules of ethics.
Furthermore, denial of statutory fees to plaintiffs' lawyers through
conditional settlement offers undermines the enforcement scheme
designed 'by Congress. The routine bargaining away of statutory
fees-whether by plaintiffs who have no financial interest in them or
by their ethical but coerced counsel-diminishes lawyers' expectations
of statutory fees in civil rights cases. Lawyers who undertake civil
rights cases will do so at their peril. The pool of lawyers willing to
represent plaintiffs in civil rights cases may shrink, forcing victims of
civil rights violations once again to rely on the "charitable instincts of a
few generous attorneys" for their legal representation-contrary to
Congress's purpose in enacting the Fees Act.'" Conditional settlement
offers deter lawyers from representing future plaintiffs who must rely
on the Fees Act to finance their legal representation. This inevitable
chilling effect on the plaintiffs' civil rights bar caused by conditional
settlement offers frustrates the basic policies of the Fees Act.
Conditional settlements where plaintiffs' counsel voluntarily offer
or agree to waive their claims to fees, however, pose no threat to the
Fees Act. A lawyer who voluntarily waives fees in one settlement
agreement has no basis to fear that a future defendant will coerce
waiver of attorneys' fees. Further, if barred by the rules of ethics,1 65 an
ethical lawyer presumably would not waive attorney's fees if to do so
would effectively restrict his ability to represent other clients. Hence,
voluntary fee waivers do not deter or disable a lawyer from represent-
101 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(B) (1981) (quoted supra note
124).
'" .A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making . . . an agreement in which a
restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between
private parties." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5(b) (Final Draft, Aug.,
1982).
I d. comment.
'" See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 638 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.s. 911 (1980).
I" See supra text following note 163.
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ing future clients.
On the other hand, conditional settlements reached by coercing
plaintiffs' counsel into waiving their fees do undermine the congres-
sional policy underlying the Fees Act by disabling or deterring lawyers
from representing future clients. Courts should protect the Fees Act
and further its goals by shielding plaintiffs' lawyers from the coercion
inherent in defendants' repeated insistence on conditioning settlement
on waiver of fees. Courts should not adopt a rigid Prandini rule be-
cause it may prevent lawyers from voluntarily waiving fees or preclude
defendants from obtaining information on which to determine their to-
tal liability.166 Nor should courts adopt an approach that requires them
to second guess a plaintiff's counsel's determination that waiving the
claim to fees would effectively preclude her or him from representing
certain clients. The court need shield a plaintiff's lawyer from simulta-
neous negotiations and conditional settlement offers only upon the law-
yer's own request. Absent a request by a plaintiff's lawyer, the court
may assume that the ongoing settlement negotiations pose no threat to
the Fees Act.
A rule that bars simultaneous negotiations only upon a plaintiff's
lawyer's request would halt the continued undermining of the Fees Act.
Safe from coercive conditional settlement offers, lawyers could prejudge
the likelihood of receiving reimbursement: statutory fees would be
awarded as a matter of course whenever the lawyer successfully repre-
sented the plaintiff in a civil rights suit. The ensurance of a fees award
furthers the policies behind the Act by "encourag[ing] litigation of the
types of actions Congress sought to stimulate.1
16 7
Shielding plaintiffs' lawyers from the coercive pressures of simul-
taneous negotiations may result in fewer settlement agreements. A de-
fendant, rather than settling a plaintiff's claim, may seek to defeat it in
order to avoid liability for the fees award. As one court observed, "it is
doubtful that Congress envisioned that [the Fees Act] would become the
catalyst for litigating a claim which otherwise would be settled.""'
Yet, Congress primarily sought to provide private citizens with the
financial means to secure legal counsel in civil right suits. 69 The Fees
Act accomplishes Congress's goal when a lawyer represents a plaintiff
in an effort to obtain judicial enforcement of rights under the federal
civil rights laws. The Fees Act has and must continue to be a catalyst
for litigating civil rights claims that otherwise would never have been
le See supra note 90.
'. Vindication of Civil Rights, supra note 1, at 352.
1 Skoda v. Fontani, 519 F. Supp. 309, 310 (N.D. IM. 1981).
See supra text following note 55.
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filed in court due only to the high costs of legal counsel. The goal of
settling rather than litigating meritorious claims must not subvert Con-
gress's intent in enacting the Fees Act.

